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28 November 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*South Vietnam: Restiveness among the South Vietnamese military command may be reaching a critical stage. Several highly placed officers apparently are convinced that only force will achieve the reforms in the Diem government which appear necessary for a victory over the Viet Cong. The deputy commander of the Third Corps Zone, Colonel Dong, told the assistant US army attaché recently that plans to bring about changes in the regime are near completion, and that "something" would be done very shortly. Emphasizing the need for strong pressure on Diem, the commander of Vietnam's field forces, Major General Duong Van Minh, and his deputy, Brigadier General Le Van Kim, told American military representatives on 24 November that the next few months could be decisive in the "extremely grave" situation in South Vietnam.

Despite strong criticism of Diem's shortcomings, the main target of these officers is Diem's brother and principal adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, whom they describe as the stumbling block to reform. They cite Nhu as responsible for charges in the controlled Vietnamese press of American highhandedness in pressing for reforms.

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*USSR--Nuclear Test Talks: The Soviet four-point proposal for a nuclear test-ban agreement is aimed at gaining propaganda points as the Geneva talks resume today. The proposals are also intended to divert discussion away from previous Soviet obstructive demands such as a "troika" scheme in the control system, and to exploit the US-UK rejection of a new moratorium on testing during the negotiations. In a move designed to appear responsive to the Western position, the Soviet statement recalled the

3 September proposal by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan for a ban on atmospheric testing, and proposed that this be extended to include outer space and underwater tests. On the crucial and unresolved issue of underground tests, Moscow proposed a moratorium pending agreement on a control system which would be a "composite part" of an international system to supervise a general disarmament agreement.

Moscow probably feels confident that the provisions it has proposed on underground tests will be rejected; and Soviet demands for French adherence to the proposed agreement are probably advanced in equal confidence of rejection by De Gaulle. It is evident that Moscow intends to use the Geneva talks as a propaganda vehicle for denouncing the continuation of Western testing, particularly any US decision to undertake atmospheric tests. [REDACTED] (Backup, Page 1)

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France-Algeria: Rebel information minister Yazid told the US Embassy in Tunis on 24 November that the provisional Algerian government (PAG) now regards the prospects for successful negotiations with the French as excellent. Yazid said that the PAG would not demand the outright release of Ben Bella and other rebel leaders held by the French, and considered the matter of their hunger strike as "settled." [REDACTED]

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Communist China - Bloc: Peiping has provided a further display of its support for Albania in the face of several recent statements by European Communist leaders which implicitly

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indict China for backing Tirana. According to a broadcast by Radio Peiping on 26 November, the leader of the Chinese Communist delegation to the Albanian youth congress declared that Albania is a "glorious member of the socialist camp," which is "always faithful to Marxism-Leninism." The delegate said that Sino-Albanian unity could not be "shaken by any force."

The issue of Chinese support for Albania may flare up in open forum during the sessions of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Moscow next week. Peiping's delegation will be headed by Liu Chang-sheng, who made the harshest of the Chinese speeches attacking Soviet positions at the WFTU meeting in 1960.

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*Dominican Republic: (information as of 0330 EST) President Balaguer has reached an impasse in his efforts for a coalition with the opposition. The politically moderate National Civic Union (UCN), the country's largest opposition group, has been using the threat of labor disorders to press Balaguer to turn the government over to UCN head Viriato Fiallo. The transition could be accomplished legally by Balaguer's naming Fiallo as Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, currently the constitutional successor to the presidency, before his own resignation.

Balaguer gave Fiallo the impression in an interview on 26 November of being willing to go along with this plan. After consulting with the present chief of the armed forces, Major General Rodriguez Echavarria, and other members of his government, however, Balaguer told the US Consul that the plan was unacceptable and that he was confident of controlling any opposition-fomented disorders. Late on 27 November UCN radiobroadcasts accused the president of bad faith and called for a nationwide general strike to begin today.

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USSR Offers New Proposal on Nuclear Test Ban

The draft treaty published by the Soviets on 27 November marks a further shift from the position taken by Moscow that a test ban agreement could be considered only as part of an agreement on complete and general disarmament. Whereas last spring and summer the Soviet delegation in Geneva insisted that a ban on tests apart from general disarmament would be unacceptable, unless the Western powers accepted the "troika" principle for controlling a test agreement, the new Soviet proposal avoids the contentious control issues and only pays lip service to a general disarmament agreement. The plan in effect calls for a separate ban on all tests and is a reversion to the position taken in early 1960, when the USSR made a similar proposal for a permanent ban on all tests except small underground testing, which would have been covered by a voluntary moratorium. That proposal was eventually modified to link the duration of the moratorium to a research program to improve detection and identification techniques; the current plan, however, would extend the moratorium on underground tests until agreement were reached on a system of controls for such tests, which would form part of an international control system for general disarmament. In this way Moscow would also avoid having to defend the "troika" plan, which it contends would not be necessary under general disarmament.

The Soviet statement accompanying the new draft treaty asserts that it represents a "new approach" and is intended to "direct" the Geneva talks into a "practical current" in order to exclude the "difficulties and obstacles which stood in the way of an agreement in the past." This line suggests that in the face of widespread criticism of Soviet testing, the Soviet leaders probably felt they could not afford to stand on either of their previous positions of linking a test treaty to agreement on complete and general disarmament or demanding a "troika" system for controls.

By retaining the distinction between underground testing and other types of tests, Moscow may also be aiming at retaining

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some freedom of maneuver to exploit the US-UK proposals for a permanent ban on atmospheric testing only. However, the over-all Soviet approach since the latest series of tests ended suggests that the USSR's main purpose at Geneva will be to repair the damage done to its international prestige.

As in the case of the Soviet note agreeing to return to the Geneva talks, the Soviet Foreign Ministry immediately passed copies of its latest proposals to the ambassadors of neutral countries. Soviet propaganda has also stressed the line that if the Western powers follow a "hypocritical policy," the Geneva talks will be useless. By coming out in favor of an immediate ban on all tests, the Soviet leaders probably hope to convince neutral opinion that the Western desire for further tests is the main obstacle to an early agreement. In this connection Khrushchev explicitly stated in a letter to the president of the World Peace Council that if the Western powers conducted tests, "we too shall be obliged to return to them in order to keep our armed forces at the modern level."

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